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[Plower can be benign or it can be dangerous. For all power tends
to develop into a government in itself. Power that controls the
economy should be in the hands of the elected representatives of
the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy.1
This statement expressed Mr. Justice Douglas' concern about the
concentration of power in the hands of a few large companies within
the United States. He clearly implied that such a concentration of
economic power can determine the way in which a society is or-
ganized. His concern is equally relevant to the Commonwealth Carib-
bean.
Most developing countries depend on foreign direct investment to
provide economic development. Because of their substantial capital re-
quirements, most foreign direct investments are made by multinational
corporations. 2 As a result, such corporations are sometimes able to
exert considerable influence over the economies of the host countries. 3
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; formerly
Lecturer in Law, University of the West Indies, Faculty of Law.
"*LL.B. University of the West Indies
1United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
2Hereinafter referred to as MNC's.3E. PENROSE, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc RELATIONS AND THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL
FIRM 107 (1970).
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Empirical data have shown that the MNC can create serious problems
even for some developed countries, resulting from government inabil-
ity to exercise effective control over the economy because the "com-
manding heights of economy" are under the control of the MNC. 4
Moreover, the flexibility, size, wealth and international market power
of the MNC can enable it to evade regulations imposed by govern-
ments. 5 Such a concentration of economic power tends to justify Mr.
Justice Douglas' fears.
The Commonwealth Caribbean countries are among those de-
veloping countries which depend most on foreign investment for
economic development. Because of the socio-economic consequences
of foreign investment by the MNC, those governments are faced with a
formidable task in safeguarding national interests.
The national interest may be defined as the capacity of a govern-
ment to mobilize its resources, goods, services and people toward the
creation of social justice and equality. 6 This definition differs from the
use of the term in the political sense. In the political arena, the national
interest is whatever the particular territory's ruling political officials
determine it to be. 7 Such a subjective approach can be dangerous,
since the national interest in the political sense will vary as the political
leaders change. Acts in the political national interest will not necessar-
ily be in the national interest in the socio-economic sense. The best
approach is to consider the goal of achievement of social justice and
equality in a state in the light of the economic and political constraints
existing there. References in this article to the national interest refer to
this socio-economic definition.
In the past, only a few governments have attempted to control
unilaterally the economic impact of the MNC. The main instrument
employed ha's been positive law. These laws have often proved ineffec-
tive, however, because "public outcry" against their enactment in the
original form forced compromise of the original legislative proposals. 8
Because of the ability and tendency of the MNC to avoid controls
imposed by a single nation, it has been argued that any attempt to
bring the MNC into closer alignment with the host government's
policies must be an integrated effort by all host governments, in order
4Beckford, The Dynamics of Growth and the Nature of Metropolitan Plantation Enter-
prises, 19 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 435, 456 (1970); see also Hymer, The Internationalization of
Capital, 6 J. ECON. ISSUES 91, 92 (1972).
5Litvak & Maule, The Multinational Firm: Some Perspectives, THE MULTINATIONAL
FIRM AND THE NATION STATE 23 (1972); see also Litvak & Maule, Foreign Corporate Social
Responsibility in Less Developed Economies, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 121 (1975).
611 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 34 (1965).
71d. at 38; see also 0. HOLSTI , INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 125-26 (1967).
8Yorke, Employers Association and the Income Tax Amendment Act of 1970, in READ-
INGS IN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE WEST INDIES 166 (1971).
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to present a united front. 9 Multilateral regulation, it is submitted, must
become the modern trend in all the developing countries. One of the
most important attempts to develop multilateral regulation has been
the May 26, 1969 signing by a group of Latin American countries of the
Agreements of Cartagena, which set up the Andean Common Market.
The Foreign Investment Code which is the principal instrument of the
Andean Common Market has been referred to as "an expression of
economic nationalism." 10 The signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas by
four independent Caribbean countries on July 4, 1973, thereby creating
the Caribbean Community, was an important step in the same direc-
tion.11 The creation and adoption of a fully thought out foreign
investment code could be a means of integrating the powerful
economic forces of the MNC into the planned development of the
whole Commonwealth Caribbean region.
Because of the dependence of the Commonwealth Caribbean
countries on foreign investment, and because of the MNC's ability to
undermine the national interest if its energies are misdirected, Carib-
bean governments must employ both municipal and international law
as instruments for safeguarding the national interest.
Investment by the MNC in the Commonwealth Caribbean
The premise that "law and economics are interdependent instru-
ments of social control"' 12 is of particular significance in relation to
underdeveloped countries such as the Commonwealth Caribbean ter-
ritories. These nations face the almost insurmountable task of ac-
celerating the rate of economic growth while at the same time seeking
to develop some form of economic nationalism. 13 The various states
are in the process of using the instruments of law and economics to
develop their resources, trying at the same time to retain control over
them. Since the area's development has not been autonomous, how-
ever, but tied to European and later American economic development,
certain elements of the economies have never been locally controlled. 14
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, after many decades of British
rule, some territories have become sovereign states' 5 while others have
9Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge to Transnational Law, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 739, 792 (1970).
1°Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1
(1972).
11 CARIBSEC, THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 79 (1973).12Elias, Law in a Developing Society, 4 NIGERIAN L.J. 1, 13 (1970).
"President Luis Echeverria Alvarez of Mexico, TIME, February 24, 1975, at 35:
We in Latin America... are confronted with a dilemma. We either open up to the
economic investments, life-style and psychological attitudes, all for the economic
development of the U.S. - in which case we are favoring a process of colonization
- or we try to exploit our natural resources and seek alliances in our own self
interest.
14A. LEWIS, GROWTH OF THE MODERN WEST INDIES 64 (1968).
15Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.
136 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
achieved a measure of self-government. 16 Yet there have been no
fundamental changes in the economies of the territories. The situation
has been analyzed in the following terms:
All the CARIFTA 17 countries - without exception - have depen-
dent and underdeveloped economies .... In spite of high and
growing levels of per capita income, the continuing underde-
velopment of the economies is manifested in heavy dependence on
foreign investment, growing unemployment and underemploy-
ment, agricultural retardation, the creation of insufficient linkages
between the economic sectors and insufficient use of domestic
natural resources, national savings, local entrepreneurship and
appropriate technologies. 18
These economic features can in part be explained by the fact that
the key sectors of all the Commonwealth Caribbean economies are
foreign owned and controlled. 19 Although in some cases the
economies of some territories have grown substantially and diversified
to a lesser degree, the "structural and institutional dependence on
foreign capital has in no way reduced."120 Considering the area's
potential for actual development it seems that foreign investment has
made only a marginal contribution to the economies of the territories in
the light of the following facts. First, only a small level of additional
employment has been created in proportion to the amount of capital
invested. Second, only a small volume of raw material is used. Third, a
large proportion of profits and interests is paid outside the territories of
the Commonwealth Caribbean. 21
The question of a development strategy that would diversify the
economies of the territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean has been
debated since the early 1940's.22 G. K. Lewis has noted that:
16Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent. Others are
still colonies. See Leacock, Essentials of Investor Protectitn in the Commonwealth Caribbean
and the United States, 1974 LAW. AM. 662, 686 n.2.
"7The territories which formerly belonged fo CARIFTA (The Caribbean Free Trade
Area) are now members of CARICOM (The Caribbean Community, including the
Caribbean Common Market).
18CARIBSEC, supra note 11, at 12.
19Beckford, supra note 4; see also P. CHEN-YOUNG, REPORT ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN
THE CARIBBEAN 3-15 (1973).20N. GIRVAN, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICA 259
(1971).
21W. Demas, The Political Economy of the English Speaking Caribbean (1971)
(unpublished thesis) cited in Grant, Political Sequel to Alcan Nationalization in Guyana:
The International Aspects, 22 SoC. & ECON. STUD. 249, 250 (1973).22LEWIS, supra note 14, at 401.
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From the beginning it embraced uncritically, both in the structure
of its tax incentives 23 and in the character of its domestic and
revenue arrangements, the model of forced manufacturing indust-
rial enterprise dependent mainly upon the capital investment of
outside business investors as the best means for transforming the
traditional West Indian economic system characterised by long-run
stagnation, structural rigidity, and high unemployment rates. The
model has flourished for some time in the Caribbean, most fam-
ously in the Puerto Rican 'Operation Bootstrap' enterprise. All
West Indian planners, irrespective of their ideological coloration,
have copied the model. The essential point to make about the
model is that in the long run it effectively precludes the pursuit of
public policies aimed towards social equality. 24
Even without adopting the Puerto Rican model, the common view
is that underdeveloped countries are incapable of establishing the type
of capital formation necessary to finance their economic development.
Two of the principal reasons put forward are (1) that domestic financ-
ing is limited and (2) that economic development cannot be carried out
at the desired speed through increased productivity and savings. 2S
The quintessence of capital formation is "the diversion of a part of
the society's currently available resources to the purpose of increasing
the stock of capital goods so as to make possible an expansion of
consumable output in the future." 26 In the Commonwealth Caribbean,
little or no capital formation is possible because there is no excess of
public revenue over public expenditure, i.e. public savings. 27
The potential of the use of the law as an instrument of economic
development was perceived by the territories ,)f the Commonwealth
Caribbean once it was realized that industr .ization of the region
could not be financed locally. The legislatures of the territories there-
fore enacted incentive legislation 28 with the objective of attracting
foreign capital to finance the territories' proposed new phase of
231n a study of tax incentives in Jamaica for the period of 1953-1962, it was found
that in terms of benefit/cost to the economy the ratio was 7:29. The Puerto Rican
program over the same period was shown to be far more efficient, the benefit/cost
ratio being 46:6. P. Chen-Young, a study of the tax incentives in Jamaica, at 302 (1966)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Pittsburgh).
241d.
2 5F. NYENGA, INVESTMENT GUARANTEES 79 (Contemporary African Monograph
Series No. 6, 1967); see also A. FAUTOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 11, 14 (1962).
2 6
R. NURKSE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 2
(1967).
2 7LEWIS, An Economist's Thoughts on the Caribbean, J. BARBADOS CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE (3d Quarter 1972) at 3.
28Some examples are: Export Industry Encouragement Law, 1956-49 (Jamaica);
Industrial Incentive Law, 1956-45 (Jamaica); Hotel Incentives Act, 1963-3 (Trinidad &
Tobago); Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance, ch. 33, No. 3, (Trinidad & Tobago);
Industrial Incentives Act, 1963-31 (Barbados); Industrial Development (Export Indus-
tries) Act, 1969-43 (Barbados); Hotel Aid Act, Title XXII, Cap. 8 (St. Vincent); Aid to
Pioneer Industries Act, Title XXIII, Cap. 1 (St. Vincent).
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economic development. This attempted solution to the problem of
underdevelopment is the accepted norm in poor countries, 2 9 since
their development is dependent on the economic assistance and
foreign direct investment of the rich or developed countries.
Foreign direct investment is of three types:30
(1) settler investment,
(2) portfolio investment, and
(3) direct investment by the MNC.
Settler investment is characterized by investment made by foreign
nationals who have migrated to the host country and have set up
business. Settler investment is usually not a particularly disfunctional
type of investment. 3 1 Portfolio investment refers to the purchase of
equity in a local enterprise by non-nationals who reside outside the
jurisdiction of the host country.32 This type of investment is funda-
mentally similar to that of the absentee planters of the old colonies. 33
Finally, direct investment by the MNC is the most dominant form of
foreign investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 34 The implica-
tions of this type of investment have been accurately analyzed in the
following terms:
Foreign direct investment through the MNC involves the transfer
of a whole productive and organizational complex, embracing a
bundle of factors of production. Not merely capital but also know-
ledge, management know-how and marketing skills. Con-
sequently the return on foreign direct investment includes at least
conceptually much more than the return on capital. It also includes
payments for management, marketing services and particularly for
technology in the form of patent fees, license fees, royalties and
technical management charges. 35
Direct investment by the MNC in the Caribbean is an economic
reality. The governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean support
and invite foreign direct investment either on very liberal terms, as in
the case of Barbados, St. Lucia and Grenada, or subject to a program of
localization as in the case of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica
and Jamaica. 36 In encouraging investment by the MNC, host govern-
ments seem to have concluded that the advantages to be derived from
such investment outweigh the disadvantages arising therefrom. Such a
29NYENGA, supra note 25; FAUTOUROS, supra note 25; see also A. LEWIS, THE THEORY
OF ECONOMIc GROWTH 258 (1965).30A. MCINTYRE & B. WATSON, STUDIES IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE CCOMMON-
WEALTH CARIBBEAN No. 1 at 1 (1970).31id. at 1-6.
321d.
3 3 E. WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 85-87 (1964).
34 MCINTYRE & WATSON, supra note 30.
351d. at 2-3.
36CHEN-YOUNG, supra note 19 at 21-35.
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conclusion does not seem to find favor with the Prime Minister of
Trinidad and Tobago, who has stated that big companies which are
supported by their governments represent the fundamental problem
for small countries. 37 Such a conclusion must be given more than scant
consideration, since it is based on more than fifteen years of direct
contacts with the MNC, especially those dealing in oil, petro-chemicals
and sugar.
Nevertheless, as long as the Commonwealth Caribbean territories
continue to have an excess of public expenditure over public revenue
and "as long as the capitalistic framework is the accepted type of
economic system, there is hardly any alternative but to continue to
encourage private, local and foreign investment." 38 The terms and
conditions under which foreign investment is encouraged and ac-
cepted can, however, be changed. In this respect Guyana, Trinidad
and Tobago, Jamaica, and Dominica have made some departure from
the norm. 39 Only Trinidad and Tobago has gone so far as to issue a
policy statement on foreign investment. 40
The foregoing represents an attempt to explain the process by
which the MNC came to the Commonwealth Caribbean. The next
logical question is what is the nature of the MNC?
The MNC has the following basic characteristics. It is a cluster of
corporations of diverse nationality. There is inter-connection between
the various corporations. Its commercial flexibility enables it to decide
whether or not to enter a particular country. 41 MNCs engage in heavy
advertising which serves in many cases as a barrier to entry into the
particular commercial activity by new firms. 42 It is a product of the
developed countries. 43 Perhaps the fundame tal characteristic of the
MNC is its wealth. A single MNC, General Motors, with its $25 billion
in annual sales is larger than the gross national product of one hundred
and thirty countries. 44 Moreover, it has been estimated that at the end
37E. WILLIAMS, PATTERNS OF PROGRESS, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: TEN YEARS OF INDE-
PENDENCE 15 (1972):
The fundamental problem that we have encountered in the first decade of Inde-
pendence, jeopardizing and even frustrating our progress, has been one over
which we necessarily have little control. That is the problem of a small country in a
big world which is generally hostile, facing not only big countries but big com-
panies - not infrequently big companies supported by the government of their
countries.
38CHEN-YOUNG, supra note 19, at 5.
391d. at 21-35.
40MCINTYRE & WATSON, supra note 30.
4 1Litvak & Maule, The Multinational Firm: Some Perspectives, THE MULTINATIONAL
FIRM AND THE NATION STATE 23 (1972).
4 2American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1945).
4 3 UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 7 (1974).
4 4R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 7 (1971). General Motors had sales of over $35
billion in 1975, but was surpassed by Exxon, which had sales of over $44 billion. Exxon
ranked first and General Motors second in the FORTUNE 500 list for 1975. FORTUNE, May
1976 at 318.
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of this century about two or three hundred large corporations will
control two thirds of the world's industrial production. 45
The result of these characteristics is that the MNC can subvert the
national interest of the developing nation in one of two ways. The first
is to threaten, defy, or dominate the host government, using the
strength of the MNC to force concessions from it. The second is to
escape the jurisdiction of the host government through concealment of
structure and activities, artful accounting schemes, and tax evasion. A
regional approach in the Commonwealth Caribbean toward the MNC
may ameliorate the first problem. Stricter, more modern, and more
effectively enforced corporate disclosure laws may solve the second.
The problem of escape from jurisdiction and its solution, disclosure
laws, will be addressed first; then the problem of control will be dealt
with.
Escape From Jurisdiction of the Government
The power and size of the MNC present many grave problems for
the host government. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago in
his "farewell speech" to the P.N.M. Convention spoke of the nature of
the threat posed by the MNC to Caribbean countries. Dr. Williams
outlined the problems in the following terms:
(1) The subsidiary is not free to choose its export markets, the
decision on which rests with the parent company.
(2) The import and export trade of many countries is to a very large
extent dominated by exchanges between subsidiaries and the
MNC.
(3) The sovereignty of a country with a subsidiary of a MNC is
further affected by the policy of the parent company of the MNC.
For example, subsidiaries of American multinational corporations
follow the United States policy of a ban on trade with China and
Cuba.
(4) Most subsidiaries are required to remit their earnings to the
parent company which prefers to advance loans to the subsidiaries
on the theory that nationalistic governments are less likely to
prevent the repayment of loans than the payment of dividends.
(5) Subsidiaries of American corporations have come to occupy a
dominant and dangerous position in the economy of the countries
in which they are located.
(6) The exchanges between subsidiaries and their parent company
make a mockery of the restrictions of national governments and
even of currency restrictions. The policy of multi-nationals is due
in part to the fear of devaluations ....
(7) The result of all this is that an affiliate or subsidiary of a MNC is
less responsive to the policy of Governments .... 46
45Schmitthoff, The Multinationals in Court, 1972 J. Bus. L. 103.
4 6PENROSE, supra note 3, at 107.
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 141
The MNC offers numerous threats that merit examination. Be-
cause of the international character of the MNC, it can defraud the host
government through the exchanges between the subsidiary and pa-
rent. It can, by means of various transfers, manipulate prices and
profits and thereby minimize its tax obligation to governments. 47
According to Norman Girvan, the classic example of this type of
practice is the case of Guyana "which has suffered significantly from
long-term under-valuation of its bauxite exports." 48 The Reynolds
subsidiary in Guyana operated from 1953-1962 free from taxation
because it could show that it suffered losses in its operations there. 49
This manipulation of tax liability through artful accounting can affect
the balance of payments of any host country. Moreover, if the MNC
were to set transfer prices at unreasonable levels, this would not only
minimize its tax liability, but it could also circumvent exchange restric-
tions and minimize customs duties.5 0
The Trinidad and Tobago government has imposed regulations on
the practice of transferring profits.-" This action by governments has
led the MNC to resort to other disguised methods in order to effect
transfer of their profits. These methods include the payment of interest
on loans to the subsidiary, fees for licensing arrangements and
management-service contracts, and payment to the parent company
for research performed. 5 2 The various methods of circumventing regu-
lations imposed by governments emphasize the need for a national law
which can ameliorate the ill effects of the circumvention. An example
of an important step in this direction is the enactment of the Insurance
Act 5 3 in Barbados. Under this act, different types of insurance com-
panies are required to make financial deposits with the government,
and the government is empowered to invest these deposits to its
advantage. 54 Although the return from this type of investment may
not compensate for losses in revenue where the regulations have been
circumvented, it at least mitigates the negative effect of the circumven-
tion.
When the head office of the MNC is required to be in alignment
with the international policies of its home government, the economy of
the host country may suffer. Specified restrictions are mainly in terms
47Address by Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, to the
15th Annual People's National Movement Convention, Sept. 28, 1973, reprinted in
Sunday Guardian (Trinidad), Sept. 30, 1973, at 3.
48Girvan, Making the Rules of the Game: Country-Company Agreements in the Bauxite
Industry, 20 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 378, 407 (1971).
49Id. at 407.
501d. at 407-08.
51U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 43, at 67.
52A withholding tax has been imposed by the Finance Act, 1966, § 23(a).53 Litvak & Maule, supra note 41, at 23-24.
541nsurance Act of 1970, § 36.
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of trade.55 In the Commonwealth Caribbean a situation of conflict may
arise, particularly since four sovereign Caribbean countries5 6 have
established diplomatic relations with Cuba. Subsidiaries of American
companies in these four countries and the Caribbean in general are
subject to the United States restrictions on trade with Cuba." 7 Such
restrictions may deprive these nations of valuable foreign exchange by
imposing upon them the political value judgments of the United
States, even though those judgments may be contrary to those made
by the host government. An extension of this doctrine is that a
subsidiary of an American oil company may refuse to supply oil to a
British ship carrying Cuban sugar.5 8
The foregoing evidence reinforces the view that while the MNC
brings economic benefits to the host country, it also creates risks for
the country that is its host.5 9 Their practices can "burden the national
balance of payments. ' ' 60 For example, between 1960 and 1968 when
about $1 billion of capital was being transferred annually to the less
developed areas, approximately $2.5 billion was being repatriated
annually in the form of income alone. 61
Against this background of potential and actual threats posed by
the MNC, governments seek to reduce the risks with legislation.
Often, however, such legislation proves to be ineffective. 62 Quite
often, too, no attempt is made to insure that the law reflects the
prevailing conditions in the particular society. An examination of the
disclosure provisions in the company law of the Commonwealth
Caribbean will serve as an example. 63
Disclosure Provisions64 in the Companies Acts of the Commonwealth Carib-
bean
The disclosure philosophy 65 of Anglo-American common law re-
quires the fullest information about companies whether or not they are
551d., § 23.
56Behrman, The Multinational Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Governmental Reactions, 6
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215, 227 (1972).
57Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.
58PENROSE, supra note 3, at 113.
191d.
6 0 VERNON, supra note 44, at 172.
611d.
6 21d.
6 3Vagts, supra note 9, at 759. See also Yorke, supra note 8, at 166.
6 4For further consideration of company law in the Commonwealth Caribbean see
generally Leacock, supra note 16.
65The European Community Commission has urged the member nations to
impose uniform accounting practices on multinational corporations. The draft direc-
tive states that their accounts must give a true and fair view of the group's assets,
liabilities, financial position and results, and that items incorporated in group ac-
counts must be valued using identical methods.
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subject to local taxation. 66 Where disclosure provisions are inadequate
or are not properly enforced, the object of the philosophy is frustrated.
Adequate disclosure is vital to the government as well as to the
investing and financial community. In this way, the economic power
and development of companies can be ascertained and can provide
some basis for planning by the government and investment decisions
by the investing community. Further, disclosure may be necessary for
the government to act in a particular way with regard to a particular
MNC in order to safeguard its national interests.
In Barbados, the government has announced that it intended to
take a top interest in requiring disclosure by the British MNC, Cable
and Wireless. 67 It announced that the "government had been pressing
Cable and Wireless to provide information on their finances and
accounting. ' 68 The company, in turn, has promised to provide the
required data "at the earliest opportunity. ' 69 The Minister of Com-
munications and Works who made the announcement stated that "the
government is still committed to taking a 51 percent interest in Cable
and Wireless, and we are anxiously awaiting financial and accounting
data from them." 7 0
The proposed acquisition of 51 per cent interest in this multi-
million dollar system is a complicated matter, and there is a clear
implication from the Minister's statement that the government does
not feel that it has sufficient information on the finances and account-
ing of the company on which to proceed effectively. This is an example
of a specific situation in which the matter of disclosure is crucial. An
examination of the disclosure provisions of the Companies Act in some
territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean will determine their
adequacy, relevance and effectiveness in terms of current economic
conditions.
Barbados:
The disclosure provisions in the Barbados Companies Act7 l cover
three types of companies: all companies with a share capital; certain
types of companies such as limited banking and insurance companies;
and companies established outside the Island.
The Act makes it mandatory for all companies having a share
capital to make an annual list of their members and the shares held by
each of them. 72 The section also has other provisions which are
66L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 446 (3d ed. 1969).
67By virtue of the various incentive legislation laws, some companies may not be
subject to local taxation.




72Barbados Companies Act 1910-7 (rev. ed. 1942).
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ancillary to matters of audit and accounts.7 3 This annual summary
must be submitted to the Registrar of the Supreme Court.
An additional requirement in the annual summary is that it must
contain a statement 74 in the form of a balance sheet. This statement
must contain "a summary of its share capital and its liabilities and its
assets giving such particulars as will disclose the general nature of
those liabilities and assets, and how the values of the fixed assets have
been arrived at, but the balance sheet need not include a statement of
profit and loss." '75
The other category of companies required to make an annual
statement consists of limited banking companies, insurance com-
panies,7 6 deposit, provident, or benefit societies. 77 Unlike Section
27(4), Section 106 does not require the statement to be submitted to the
Registrar, only that it must be kept at the registered office. Insurance
companies are governed by the Insurance Act. 78
The third category of companies for which there are disclosure
provisions are those companies established outside the Island. Such
companies are required to file with the Registrar a certified copy of
their charter, statutes, or memorandum and articles of the company
and a list of their directors. 79 In addition, a statement in the form of a
balance sheet must also be filed with the Registrar. °
The Barbados Companies Act has remained substantially the same
as it was when it was first enacted in 1910. In the interim, direct foreign
investment by the MNC has brought substantial economic develop-
ment. Company law should develop as it has in the United Kingdom,8 '
which provided the model for the Barbados Act of 1910, in order to
cope with practices of companies in the 1970's and beyond. It is clearly
because of the need for more effective provisions in the light of
corporate behavior that the Insurance Act was enacted, and it is
submitted that the same need applies to all other companies operating
in Barbados.
73id. § 27.
74§§ 27(2a)-27(2m) require particulars such as: a) the amount of share capital; b)
the number of shares issued since commencement; c) total amount paid as a commis-
sion re shares or allowed by way of discount in respect of any debenture; d) the names
of the directors; e) total amount due from the company in respect of all mortgages and
charges which are required to be registered with the Registrar under the Act.
7"Except where the company is a private company.
76Barbados Companies Act 1910-7, § 27(3).
771nsurance companies are now governed by the provisions of the Insurance Act
1970-36 where the disclosure provisions are very substantial.
78This statement must include: the name of the company, its objects, share capital
and shares, and whether it is limited or unlimited. Barbados Companies Act 1910-7, §
106.
79Barbados Insurance Act 1970-36.
8°Id., § 4.
"'Barbados Companies Act 1910-7, § 223.
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In addition to the fact that the disclosure provisions of the Bar-
bados Companies Act are inadequate, the problem is exacerbated by
the administration of the Act. Under the Act the Registrar of the
Supreme Court is charged with its administration.8 2 This is in addition
to the many other duties8 3 he has to perform. The situation which
obtains in Barbados is similar to that of all other Caribbean territories
with the exception of Jamaica,8 4 where there is a separate office of
Registrar of Companies.
In territories which do not have a separate office of Registrar of
Companies it is clear that companies may possibly violate the provi-
sions of the Companies Act without being detected.8 s
St. Vincent:
The most detailed provisions with regard to disclosure by com-
panies is contained in Section 37 of the Companies Act. 86 Under this
section companies such as limited banking companies, all insurance
companies, deposit, and provident or benefit societies have an obliga-
tion before they commence business (and yearly thereafter) to prepare
a statement. This statement must indicate the current state of the
company's capital, its liabilities, debts owed by the company, and its
assets.8 7 It is further provided that this statement must be kept in the
registered office of the company, branch offices, or its other places of
business.8 8 A penalty is imposed by this section for failure to comply
with its provisions.8 9 The statute, however, does not require the
company to submit documents required by Section 37 to the Registrar.
Since the dominant type of private investment in the Common-
wealth Caribbean is by the MNC, and because of the nature and
capabilities of the MNC, these disclosure provisions in the St. Vincent
Companies Act are also inadequate. In order to obtain adequate
information, the disclosure provisions must be more elaborate. The
Companies Act must also make it mandatory that the information be
filed with the Registrar of Companies.
8 2 d., § 223(3). The MNC can circumvent these requirements by forming a
subsidiary in Barbados as a private company and operating through it.83See generally L. GOWER, supra note 66.84 Barbados Companies Act 1910, § 214, Registration Office Act 1961-34, § 2 and
sched. 1. Similarly: St. Vincent Companies Act, Title XXIII, ch. 6, § 138, St. Vincent
The Registrar Ordinance, Table 1, ch. 6, §§ 3, 4. Trinidad & Tobago: Companies Act,
ch. 31, § 285, Registrar General Ordinance, ch. 28, No. 1, §§ 2, 4.
8 These duties include: 1) Custody of court records and papers; 2) Administering
oaths and taking affidavits; 3) Signing all court documents; 4) Keeping records of
judicial proceedings; 5) Issuing writs; 6) Keeping a court book; 7) Preparing judg-
ments; 8) Keeping various public registers, e.g. doctors, dentists, and druggists and
performing certain functions in respect thereof; 9) Receiving and keeping certain legal
documents, e.g., deeds and company documents.
86jamaica Companies Act of 1965, § 333.
87Leacock, supra note 16, at 672 n.90.
88Laws of St. Vincent, ch. 6 (rev. ed. 1966).
89 d., § 37.
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Trinidad and Tobago:
The Trinidad and Tobago Companies Act 90 has one set of disclo-
sure provisions for companies incorporated in Trinidad and Tobago
and another set for companies incorporated outside the state.
Companies incorporated in Trinidad and Tobago are governed by
Section 106 of the Act, which makes it mandatory for every company
with a share capital "once at least in every year" to make a detailed
return in accordance with the form set out. This return must state
many details particularly in regard to shares, and the indebtedness of
the company in respect of all mortgages and charges which are re-
quired to be registered with the Registrar. 9
Section 107(1) states that every company not having a share capital
"shall once at least in every calendar year make a return" stating
among other things the names of its directors. Additionally, Section
107(2) provides that "there shall be annexed to the return a statement
containing particulars of the total amount of debentures of the com-
pany in respect of all mortgages and charges which are required to be
registered with the Registrar under the Ordinance." 92
The disclosure provisions of the Trinidad and Tobago Companies
Act are an improvement on the disclosure provisions in both the
Barbados and St. Vincent Companies Acts. In addition to the provi-
sions of Sections 106(3) and 107(2), Section 108(3) of the Act provides
that all companies must include with their annual return a certified
copy of the last balance sheet audited by the company's auditors. The
effectiveness of the provisions is vitiated, however, by the fact that
private companies are exempted from the provisions of Section
108(3). 93 This means that if the MNC is a private company, which is
frequent in Trinidad and Tobago, Section 108(3) does not apply.
The disclosure provisions relating to companies incorporated out-
side of Trinidad and Tobago are equally elaborate. If such companies
establish a place of business within the state, they must deliver to the
Registrar for registration the following documents: (a) certified copies
of the charter, statutes or memorandum and articles of the company;
(b) a list of directors of the company; (c) names and addresses of one or
more persons resident in the state authorized to accept service of
process and notice on behalf of the company. 94
Section 301(1) requires delivery of a balance sheet for registration
with the Registrar every calendar year. There are no express provisions
which specifically refer to the disclosure of accounts and audits by
companies incorporated outside of Trinidad and Tobago. However, it
90 d.
9 1 d.
92Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, ch. 31, No. 1, Vol. IV (rev. ed. 1950).
93 d., §§ 106(3)(a)-106(3)(o).
941d., § 107(2).
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is submitted that the language of Section 106(1)95 of the Act, which
requires disclosure of accounts and audits generally, includes com-
panies incorporated outside of the state by necessary implication. The
MNC can avoid the rigor of these disclosure provisions by operating in
Trinidad and Tobago not as a company incorporated outside the state,
but by forming a subsidiary in Trinidad and Tobago as a private
company and operating through the subsidiary and thereby availing
itself of the exemptions in Section 108(3).
Jamaica:
The Jamaica Companies Act 96 is the most up-to-date in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean in terms of attempting to cope with current
economic and financial reality. The other Companies Acts in the
Commonwealth Caribbean are based on pre-1948 English Companies
Acts. In Jamaica, the 1948 English Companies Act 97 was used as a
model for the new Act.
Like most of the other acts in the region, the Jamaica act distin-
guishes between public and private companies. The point of departure
in the case of Jamaica is that private companies are required to file
accounts in certain circumstances. 98 The prescribed circumstances in-
sure that disclosure has to take place if a MNC is a shareholder in any
company there whether public or private.
In terms of disclosure by annual returns, every company with a
share capital, 99 companies without a share capital1 ° ° and those com-
panies that are so required by the Act10 1 must prepare annual returns
which must be filed with the Registrar 10 2 within a specified time. 10 3
The general provisions with regard to annual returns are that every
company which is not a private company, but including those private
companies required to file annual returns, shall file detailed accounts
with the Registrar.1 0 4 These include a written copy, certified by a
director, manager or the secretary of the company to be a true copy, of
the last balance sheet and profit and loss account laid before the
company in general meeting.1 0 5 In addition, "every document re-
quired by law to be annexed thereto" 106 must also be submitted.
95 1d., § 108.
96 d., § 298.
97"Every company having a share capital...;" § 107(1) "Every company not having a
share capital..." (emphasis added).
98Laws of Jamaica, 1965-7 (1965).
9 9English Companies Act, 1948, 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38.
100 1f any of the shares of the private company are held by a body corporate.
Jamaica Companies Act of 1965, § 30(3).
1°11d., § 121.
10 2 d., § 122.
1031d., 88 30(3) and 124.
104The Register of Companies, § 333.1 05 d., § 123.
1O61d.
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By Section 336(1) the duty imposed on companies to make returns
to the Registrar can be enforced by a Judge in Chambers. Since Jamaica
has a separate Registrar of Companies, 10 7 it may be expected that
company law in Jahaica should be better administered.
The Jamaica Companies Act has separate disclosure provisions'018
relating to companies incorporated outside the Island but carrying on
business within the Island. Such companies which establish a place of
business within Jamaica after the commencement of the Act must
deliver certain documents to the Registrar. 10 9 These documents in-
clude a certified copy of the company charter, a list of its directors and
the name of a person in the Island authorized to receive notices on its
behalf. 110 Further, any alteration in the above documents must be
reported to the Registrar within a specified time."1
Additionally, all companies incorporated outside the Island,
shall in every calendar year make out a balance sheet and profit
and loss account, and if the company is a holding company, group
accounts in such form, and containing such particulars and includ-
ing such documents, as under the provisions of this Act it would, if
it had been a company incorporated under this Act, have been
required to make out and lay before the company in general
meeting, and deliver a copy of those documents to the Registrar for
registration. 112
Since there is no exemption from the disclosure provisions for public
companies or private companies where a body corporate is a sharehol-
der, in Jamaica the MNC must disclose fully as required by the Act.
The Jamaica Companies Act is, therefore, an improvement over all the
other Companies Acts in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The realiza-
tion that companies in general and the MNC in particular should
disclose more information is clear, and is given expression in the Act.
As the Minister of Trade and Industry at the time the Act was debated
in Parliament pointed out, the Committee which was assigned the task
of preparing the bill "drew heavily from Commonwealth legislation
and experiences in company law."'1 3
However, even Jamaica has not gone far enough in the direction of
disclosure. "4 It should also have enacted provisions similar to those









1141d. § 349(1) (emphasis added).
11 Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Session 1964-65, vol. 1, at 220-21.
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 149
disclosure philosophy is an ongoing process 116 which has to be given
legislative expression in parallel with the practical need to extend it,
and Jamaica has not extended the disclosure provisions which were
adopted in the United Kingdom as long ago as 1948 when the MNC
was in its embryonic stage. It is submitted that not only Jamaica but
also the other Commonwealth Caribbean territories ought to adopt the
further disclosure provisions of the U.K. Companies Act of 1967. It has
been suggested that "good corporate behaviour" includes not only
hiring local employees, the retention of earnings in the best state, the
sale of shares to local investors and the autonomy"17 of the subsidiaries
from both parent company and foreign government control, but also
the provision of detailed accounting and operating information to the
public." 8 It is unlikely that companies will voluntarily disclose such
detailed information. Adequate disclosure must, therefore, be compul-
sory.
Control of MNC by the Governments in the Commonwealth Carribean
The wealth, power and flexibility of the MNC is today a fact of life.
The political implications of a situation where a MNC performs a major
economic function in a small economy is summed up by this example:
There remains the question of the political impact of a large world
corporation in a country such as Honduras. The United Fruit
Company, for example, last year provided 11.2% of the country's
taxes, 6% of its foreign exchange and 6.98% of its gross national
product. It would be foolish to pretend that the company is
without influence in Honduras. 119
116Leacock, Company Law Reform in Jamaica, 1975 J. Bus. L. 252.
'"English Companies Act, 1948, 12 Geo. 6, ch. 81.
118L. GOWER, supra note 66, at 454:
Compulsory disclosure through accounts is a method of providing information
about companies which the legislature adopted at a comparatively late stage. It was
not until 1908 that companies were compelled to publish their balance sheets, nor
until 1929 that they were made to circulate to their members.., the profit and loss
account. And it was only by the 1948 Act that a serious attempt was made to lay
down in detail how these documents were to be prepared and by the 1967 Act that
they were made available to the public in the case of all limited companies. This Act
also added substantially to the amount of information which has to be given and a
new and amplified schedule 8 which lays down the details which must appear in
the balance sheet and profit and loss account. (Author's footnotes omitted)
119Cornuelle, The Enormous Future: An Outline to the Challenge of the Multinational
Corporation, UNITED FRUIT COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT, 1968, quoted in Beckford, supra
note 4, at 456. The United Brands Company, the successor to the United Fruit Co.,
paid a $1.25 million bribe to an official of the government of Honduras to obtain a cut
in the export tax on bananas. This led to the overthrow of Gen. Arellano as Chief of
State of Honduras. There are other recent examples of corporate misbehavior by
multinationals, most notably Lockheed in Japan, which have led to an extensive
inquiry by the Church Committee in the U.S. Senate and the continuing calls for
greater control of multinationals as the full extent of their malpractices is uncovered.
MNC's perform a major economic function in other Commonwealth Caribbean
territories. In Barbados, seventy-five percent of the equity of the Barbados Light and
Power Co. Ltd., which has monopoly power over electricity production in the island,
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Because of these characteristics, the MNC can negotiate with
governments from a position of strength and thereby often obtain
concessions that other enterprises cannot. For example, Reynolds
Bauxite Company would not carry out capital expansion in Jamaica
unless the government was prepared to make a "package deal" cover-
ing revenue and all other aspects of its relationship with the govern-
ment.1 20 In 1969, Tate and Lyle threatened to close down its Jamaica
operations if the government did not agree to its demands for greater
mechanization of the sugar industry and the establishment of bulk
loading facilities.1 21
G. K. Lewis describes the problems created by such power and
domination:
The essential point.., about the model is that in the long run it
precludes the pursuit of public policies aimed toward social equal-
ity. .. It facilitates the entry of expatriate capital operations which
have the dual effect of (1) increasing the degree of expatriate
ownership of resources in the economy, and (2) reducing the local
business groups to the status of subordinate partners in a network
of international capitalist investment and financial operations, so
that they become for all intents and purposes dependent entre-
preneurs undertaking a middle class trusteeship of foreign holdings.
A new dependent relationship upon outside forces makes itself
felt; vital resources especially in the extractive industries are alien-
ated by the location (as in Caribbean bauxite) of the smelting and
fabricating processes away from the point of extraction; while
production and employment policies are made by overseas head
offices unconcerned with local development policies. 122
is owned by Canadian International Power Ltd., a Canadian MNC. The Barbados
Telephone Co. Ltd., which has monopoly power over telephone services in the island,
is a subsidiary (eighty-six percent) of Continental Telephone International Corpora-
tion, an American MNC. See Leacock, Public Utility Regulation in a Developing Country,
1976 LAw. AM. 338. One-hundred percent of the commercial banking system is run by
subsidiaries of British, Canadian and United States MNC's engaged in banking, most
notably Barclay's Bank International Limited (a British MNC), Bank of Nova Scotia
Ltd. and Royal Bank of Canada Ltd. (Canadian MNC's), and Chase Manhattan Corp.
(a United States MNC).
In Guyana, Booker McConnell Ltd. (a British MNC) is the dominant force in
agriculture. Along with Jessell Securities Ltd. (another British MNC), it controls
approximately ninety percent of Guyana's sugar production. "Sugar production is
Guyana's major agricultural activity ... sugar companies [employ] over 25,000 work-
ers... about 13[%] of Guyana's work-force... and account for about 15[%] of
Guyana's GNP and 35[%] of her foreign exchange earnings." See Litvak and Maule,
Foreign Corporate Social Responsibility in Less Developed Economies, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L.
125 (1975).
12°Girvan, supra note 48, at 414.
12t Beckford, supra note 4, at 486.
122English Companies Act, 1948, 12 Geo. 6, ch. 81.
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Such economic policies are "likely to contribute to persistent
underdevelopment,"' 12 3 but as long as the capitalistic framework re-
mains the economic system in force, there is no viable alternative to
continuing to encourage private local and foreign investment. 124 The
terms and conditions under which foreign investment is accepted,
however, should be structured to encourage "indigenizing" the
economies in the long run. This would require finding alternatives to
foreign ownership of vital economic sectors, thereby retaining national
autonomy and safeguarding national interests.
Safeguarding national interests in the Commonwealth Caribbean
is best achieved by unified regional efforts. This is so because the
individual territories have relatively small economies, they have had
similar historical experiences, and their economies have similar charac-
teristics. Moreover, regional economic integration is gaining momen-
tum through the operation of CARICOM. 125 Regional economic inte-
gration has been gaining adherents worldwide. Examples are the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the Central American Common Market,
the East African Community and the Andean Common Market. In
addition the French speaking countries of West Africa have recently
decided to form the West African Economic Community. 126 Coordi-
nated planning through CARICOM should be the basis for safeguard-
ing national interests in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Regional plans
should be implemented through municipal law in the individual ter-
ritories.
An important example of safeguarding national interests through
regional integration is the Agreement of Cartagena which was signed
by five states: Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.1 27 The
Agreement was motivated by the economic and political difficulties
these countries experienced as members of the Latin America Free
Trade Association (LAFTA). 128 In this agreement, the members of the
group agreed to establish certain organs that are intended to be used in
overcoming the economic difficulties they face in their territories.
These organs include the Andean Common Market, the Andean De-
velopment Corporation, and the Andean Multinational Enterprise.1 29
The most important instrument for the purposes of this article is
the Andean Foreign Investment Code. The Code aimed at protecting
12 3The point that subsidiaries of the MNC are not usually autonomous has been
made by several writers. See, e.g., Address by Williams, supra note 47; Schmitthoff,
supra note 45, at 105; Behrman, supra note 56, at 217; K. NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM
176 (1965); Girvan, supra note 48, at 407.
124Behrman, supra note 56, at 230.
12 5PENROSE, supra note 3, at 132.
126LEWIS, supra note 14, at 401.12 7G. BECKFORD, PERSISTENT POVERTY 219 (1972).
128P. CHEN-YOUNG, REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN 5 (1973).
129See text accompanying note 17, supra.
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national interests by forming an economic group in which investment
can be regulated to the members' advantage. 130 The members of
CARICOM should emulate the members of the Andean group by
agreeing on a code of investment. This instrument should then be
enacted into the municipal law of the individual contracting states,
thus giving it full legal force in the territory of each state.
The stated purpose of the Andean Foreign Investment Code is "to
provide a general framework for regulating foreign investment which
shall be the minimum policy in member countries on the subject." 131 It
is possible for any individual contracting state to impose stronger
restrictions in its own municipal law. Feasibility of stronger restric-
tions, of course, depends upon the level of foreign control in the
particular economy. 132
Article 1 of the Code divides all enterprises into three main groups
with each group having different privileges and protections. These
groups are: (1) A National Enterprise in which over eighty percent of
the equity and management lie in national investors; (2) A Mixed
Enterprise, in which national investors control from fifty-one to eighty
percent of the firm's equity and management; (3) A Foreign Enterprise,
in which foreign investors own more than half of the equity or have
effective control over management. 133
These divisions form the fundamental basis of the Code which is
the theory of transformation from foreign to indigenous. 134 The es-
sence of the theory of transformation is that those firms wishing to
benefit from the privileges and protections of the Andean Common
Market must transform themselves over a fixed period of time. 135
One of the more substantial provisions of the Code is found in
Article 3. The provisions of this article prohibit foreign investment in
certain areas of the economy. These prohibited areas are reserved for
local investors. 136 Similarly, Article 37 places limitations in regard to
the reinvestment and repatriation of capital. The article limits the
repatriation of capital to fourteen percent of the direct foreign invest-
ment. 137 Further, Articles 12 and 13 place restrictions on the amount of
13 0CARIBSEC, supra note 11, at 15.
13 1Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969. English text
located in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969). See Valdez, supra note 10. Venezuela is
now also a member.
132Valdez, supra note 10, at 2.
133Id. at 2-5.
134Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses and Royalties, Dec. 31, 1970. English text located in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
126 (1972). Mexico also enacted a comprehensive Foreign Investment Law in 1973. Its
operation is reviewed by Camp & Magnon, Recent Developments Under the Mexican
Foreign Investment Law and the Law Regulating the Transfer of Technology, 1975 LAw. AM.
1.




capital a foreign corporation may reinvest. In addition, the areas of
reinvestment in the economy are also limited by Articles 34, 41, 42 and
43.138
Some criticism has been made of the Andean Foreign Investment
Code. It has been said that it is "somewhat too restrictive." 139 One
should bear in mind, however, that Latin America has suffered se-
verely from exploitation, and this type of regulation is necessary in
order to stamp it out and to focus foreign investment on positive
cooperation in the interests of mutual benefit.
One effect of the restrictions imposed by the Code being enacted
into municipal law by the respective states is that an estimated eleven
billion dollars of American investment within the Andean Common
Market will have to be divested. 140 Consequently, the general Ameri-
can reaction has not been enthusiastic. 141 However, Valdez takes the
view that the Andean Foreign Investment Code may have a needed
stabilizing effect upon investment in the area. 142 For example, Mexico
with its strict investment laws143 has not suffered any significant
adverse economic effects, but instead has one of the most favorable
investment climates for foreign investment. 144
The Agreement of Cartagena and the Treaty of Chaguaramas are
similar in many respects. In addition to the similarity in motive for the
respective agreements, the socio-economic circumstances and the ob-
jectives are in harmony. The preamble to the Treaty of Chaguaramas
emphasizes the determination of the contracting parties to strengthen
the long standing ties which have existed among their people and their
determination to eliminate unemployment an ' to improve standards
of work and living. It further recognizes that t ese objectives could be
attained most rapidly
by the optimum utilization of available human and natural re-
sources, by accelerated, co-ordinated and sustained economic de-
velopment, particularly through the exercise of permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources; by the efficient operation
138Art. 5 of the Mexican Foreign Investment Law of 1973 has as its objective the
"Mexicanization" of corporations operating in the state. This means a majority
representation of Mexican ownership at the Board of Directors level. See note 134
supra.139Art. 27 quoted in Valdez, supra note 10, at 8.
1401d. at 3.
14 11d. at 11.
142Id.
143Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Williams, People's National Movement's
Perspectives in the World of the Seventies 8 (Nov. 27, 1970) (Special P.N.M. Party
Convention, Chaguaramas). Chile has not taken a similar view as well and has been
lobbying to reduce the stringency of the treaty's provisions. See Wall St. J., May 24,
1976, at 6, col. 1.
1'"Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L
LAw. 65 (1972).
154 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
of common services and functional cooperation in the social, cul-
tural, educational and technological fields and by a common front
in relation to the external world.145
The Caribbean Common Market 14 6 which is the economic organ of
the Caribbean Community is governed by the Annex to the Treaty.
Chapter VI of the annex contains provisions which can be used as the
basis for developing rules to govern foreign investment. For instance,
"Member States shall seek to harmonize such legislation and practices
as directly affect fiscal incentives to industry."' 147 Member States of
CARIFTA 148 concluded an agreement to this effect. "The Agreement
rationalizes the granting of concessions to industry in the area and will
come into existence when at least ten of the member states have
deposited Instruments of Ratification with the Caribbean Sec-
retariat." 14 9 Individual member states will have to enact legislation
before this agreement will become municipal law.
Other important articles of the Treaty of Chaguaramas cover
matters such as Harmonization of Laws,15 0 Monetary Payments and
Exchange Rate Policies,' 1" Ownership and Control of Regional Re-
sources,15 2 and Co-ordination of National Development Planning.15 3
Membership of the Caribbean Community and Common Market is
open to thirteen Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Of these coun-
tries, there are six independent states, 5 4 five associate states 5 5 and
two colonies. 5 6 The associate states and the colonies do not have the
capacity in international law to deal directly with international organi-
zations other than as associate members.' 57 Article 2 of the Treaty and
Article 2 of the Annex of the Treaty contain provisions to accomodate
these states as members of the Community and Common Market
respectively. By the arrangement of associate membership,15 8 the
145Schliesser, Restrictions in Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, 5
INT'L LAW. 586 (1971).
146Valdez, supra note 10, at 19.
147For instance, it is required that in auto parts manufacturing, 60 percent of any
enterprise must be locally owned. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra
note 43, at 76. See also note 134, supra.
148Valdez, supra note 10, at 19.149Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973. English text




1'5 ld. at art. 40.
152Caribbean Free Trade Area, the forerunner of the Caribbean Community.
15 3BARBADOS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, HARMONIZATION OF FISCAL INCEN-
TIVES TO INDUSTRY 1 (1973).
15 4Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 149, at art. 42.
1551d. at art. 43.
15 6Id. at art. 44.
15 71d. at art. 45.
1'5 Note 15, supra.
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associate states and colonies can be included in agreements by the
Caribbean Community.
The territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean should also coor-
dinate their efforts in negotiating International Double Taxation
Agreements, which can serve as an incentive to investment in the
region.15 9 These agreements bring about co-ordination in taxing
policies whereby companies and individuals are not subjected to tax on
the same item by both countries. 160 In the Commonwealth Caribbean a
number of territories have concluded double taxation agreements with
Britain, 161 and these agreements should be extended to other capital
exporting countries. Agreements with the capital exporting countries
on the transfer of technology also need to be coordinated and carefully
worked out. 162
Particular attention must be paid to the serious difficulties which
usually arise in reconciling conflicting interests between the host and
home countries. 163 Clive Thomas in his study on the sugar industry in
Guyana has suggested that the corporate structure in the sugar indus-
try "clearly mitigates against the national interest."' 164 The corporate
structure can certainly be used to facilitate the reduction of the amount
of tax due to the Government. Norman Girvan has shown that the
Reynolds' subsidiary that operated in Guyana from 1953 to 1962 did
not pay any taxes whatever on its income as "it had sustained losses in
its operations" which offset any liability it might have had to pay
taxes. 165 In an interview, 166 Barbados' Commissioner of Inland Re-
venue implied that wider powers were necessary as far as the taxing
statutes were concerned. 167
The administration of company law needs -adical improvement. In
all the jurisdictions in this study with the exception of Jamaica, the
administration of company law is the responsibility of the Registrar of
the Supreme Court who also has many other functions. Under these
circumstances, companies can avoid the legal requirements of the
Companies Acts. Dr. Pennington in his Report on the revision of
company law in Trinidad and Tobago identified several shortcomings
159 Note 16, supra.
1601d.
1611 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1970).
1621d. at 285.
'
63Fink, Tax Treaties as a Means of Encouraging Investment in Developing Countries,
1971 ISRAEL L. REV. 201.
164E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 248 (1965).
16 5These include: Antigua, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada,
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. R. DIBDEN,
INDEX TO DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS 5-19 (1971).166U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 43, at 78.
16 7See The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev/ST/
ESA/6 (1973).
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in the administration of company law there and recommended the
establishment of a separate Registrar of Companies.168 Such an office
already exists in Jamaica, 169 and this reform can be of immediate
benefit in the other jurisdictions.
In recent times, governments, particularly in Asia and Latin
America, have resorted to joint ventures between themselves and
foreign investors as a legal device for safeguarding national interests. 170
This form of business enterprise in developing countries enables them to
participate directly in their own economic development, while at the
same time harnessing and benefitting from the power of the MNC. 171
In many developing countries, the equity capital for joint ventures
is largely provided by external sources because of the lack of indigenous
capital. 172 In the Commonwealth Caribbean, joint ventures can play an
important part in ensuring that governments attain sufficient control
over their economies. The chronic shortage of adequate indigenous
capital which afflicts the area should be ameliorated by the operations of
the Caribbean Development Bank which is an Associate Institution of
the Caribbean Community. 173 Its vital role is:174
To contribute to the harmonious economic growth and development
of the member countries of the Caribbean and to promote economic
cooperation and integration among them, having special and urgent
regard to the needs of the less developed members of the region. 175
In addition, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados are members
of the Inter-American Development Bank. This represents another
source of capital. 176
16 8Thomas, Sugar Economics in a Colonial Situation, STUDIES IN EXPLOITATION 15-16
(1974).
16 9Girvan, supra note 48, at 408.
170 nterview with L. G. Campbell, Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Barbados, in
Bridgetown, Barbados (Feb. 11, 1974).
17 1R. PENNINGTON, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF COMPANY LAW IN TRINIDAD AND
TOBAGO 1 (1967). The more important functions of the Registrar would be: (a) Examin-
ing prospectuses filed by the companies and requiring amendments to be made in
them if they are defective; (b) appointing inspectors to investigate the affairs of
companies where there is reason to suspect unlawful operations; (c) instituting
proceedings (civil or criminal) in response to investigations; and (d) registering
investment trust companies and companies which advertise for deposits, supervising
their operations, and revoking their registratio if they misconduct themselves.
172Jamaica Companies Act of 1965, § 333.
173W. FRIEDMAN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES 3 (1971). Examples include: Grands Moulins de Paris and the Govern-
ment of Congo (Brazzaville) - refiners of sugar and other food products; the Nestle's
Company and the Government of Nicaragua - manufacturers of powdered milk;
Mannesman AG (Germany) and the Government Investment Bank of Turkey -
manufacturers of steel pipes; N. V. Phillips and the Government of Indonesia -
manufacturers of electronic products; and Unilever and a Government Corporation in
Ghana - manufacturers of textiles.
1741d. at 17.
175Id.
176Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 149, at art. 14.
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Joint ventures already operate in Jamaica and Trinidad and To-
bago. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, however, they have not been
subject to the doctrine of indiginization required by the Andean
Foreign Investment Code, or that required by the law of some African
countries. Only the Trinidad and Tobago Government has enumerated
a clear policy on foreign investment. Its stated objective is to reserve
certain sectors of the economy for nationals to encourage joint ven-
tures, and to require certain reinvestment of profits by subsidiaries of
foreign companies. 177 The Jamaican Government has not enunciated
an official policy as in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, but on the basis
of statements by a number of government Ministers, its policy appears
to be similar to that of Trinidad and Tobago. 178 The Barbados Govern-
ment, on the other hand, has declared that its policy on foreign
investment is "free and open.' ' 17 9 St. Vincent apparently has no policy
on foreign investment. 180
The governments of the Commonwealth Caribbean should pro-
ceed on a venture by venture basis rather than enacting legal require-
ments for joint ventures generally between the government and the
MNC. An approach more consistent with the protection of national
interests and the control of national resources would be to enact
legislation requiring certain existing companies 8" to become joint ven-
tures over a specified period of time. Similiarly, future investments in
the most important projects should be on a joint venture basis only.
Recently enacted laws in Ghana and Nigeria have indicated that
the governments of these countries recognize the limitations and
dangers of excessive reliance on foreign private investment. By virtue
of these laws, each government "seeks progressive indigenization of
its... economy while garnering increasing governmental influence
over expatriate enterprises."' 18 2 These laws in fact are not intended to
introduce joint ventures but are intended to effect transfers of foreign
businesses to nationals on a progressive basis. Perhaps they go too far.
For example, the Ghana Business (Promotions) Act § 1970-34, in
addition to providing for the transfer of certain specified small and
medium sized businesses, prohibits further foreign enterprises in
certain sectors. 183 It also requires in Section 6(a) of the Capital Invest-
ment Act § 1963-172, that in order to qualify for fiscal incentives for an
"approved project," training programs in the administrative and tech-
177D. DELUPIs, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9(1973).17Articles of the Caribbean Development Bank Agreement, art. 1. See Uchegbu,
The Caribbean Development Bank, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 568 (1973).
179D. DELUPIS, supra note 177, at 9.
'
80 CHEN-YOUNG, supra note 19, at 23.
1 1Md. at 27.
1821d. at 25.1831d. at 34.
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nical fields for Ghanaians must be instituted. 184 The Nigeria Decree
No. 22 has similarly reserved certain categories of business for nation-
als. 185
These legal provisions in Ghana and Nigeria are radical, and time
will determine whether they eventually prove to be successful. This
progressive transfer of nationals, however, could result in the concen-
tration of economic power in the hands of a national oligarchy. One
should stop to consider whether the new economic order would
function more effectively in the national interest than the old. Such
fears have already been expressed by the Prime Minister of Bar-
bados. 186
The better approach would be to enact legislation requiring certain
established and future enterprises to be joint ventures, thereby coun-
terbalancing local and foreign economic participation. The government
should, where necessary and practical, be involved in these joint
ventures. These joint ventures must be designed to enhance the
development of the national economy and the technical and adminis-
trative skills of the nationals. The training program for nationals which
has been required in the Ghanaian Capital Investments Act § 1963-172
should be part of future legislation in the Commonwealth Caribbean
on joint ventures. Hand in hand with the development of joint ven-
tures must be the development of antitrust provisions 187 to ensure that
there is no undue concentration of economic power in the hands of an
oligarchy. Monopoly controls should be implemented to monitor, in
the national interest, the operation of business activity where
economic necessity makes the development of monopolies inevitable.
Nationalization is another measure which can be employed by a
government in order to protect its national interests.18 It is, however,
an extreme measure, and the reverbations resulting from resorting to it
are always loud and enduring. Often too, the long-term negative effect
outweighs the short-term satisfaction arising from seizure of
sovereignty over particular resources. The financial and economic
trauma that follow in its wake destroy private business confidence and
destabilize private investment. Furthermore, there is a growing wari-
ness of investing in developing countries in general, and the Caribbean
in particular at this time. 189 This reluctance reinforces the view that
184For example, banks, insurance companies, public utilities and companies
involved in minerals. France, for example, is trying to gain control of its high
technology industries from U.S. multinational corporation. See BUSINESS WEEK, May
17, 1976, at 47.
'
85McDonald, Recent Litigation in Nigeria and Ghana Affecting Foreign Direct Private
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joint ventures on the basis of cooperation and negotiation are the best
proposition.
Indeed, except for the nationalization of DEMBRA, the local sub-
sidiary of ALCAN by the Government of Guyana in 1971,190 nationali-
zation has not so far been employed with the same rigor and motives as
in some Latin American and Arab countries. 191 Further, the constitu-
tions of the independent and the Associated States 192 provide for
non-deprivation of property, 193 except by the authority of written
law, 194 and for compensation where a person is so deprived. 19 The
Trinidad and Tobago Constitution has no specific provision for com-
pensation, but indirectly provides for compensation through judicial
review.196 The St. Vincent Constitution provides for "full compensa-
tion," while those of Jamaica and Barbados provide for "compensa-
tion." The question arises whether compensation in Barbados and
Jamaica could be less than the true value of the property. In the Indian
case of State of West Bengal v. Bela Banergee, 197 the Supreme Court held
that where "compensation" is not qualified in the constitution, it was
equivalent to full indemnification for that of which the owner had been
deprived. 19 This decision would be persuasive authority in litigation
in Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions.
Clearly, the foregoing constitutional provisions create legal power
for the nationalization of property under the authority of written law.
Nationalization, however, should be a last resort. Any territory that
chooses to use it should first insure that it has access to the technical
and administrative capacities to run the particular enterprise, in view
of the international pressure which can be exerted on a host govern-
19 0For an exploration of the creation and implementation of antitrust laws in the
Caribbean region, see Rubin, Competition Policy and the Caribbean Community, 9 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 398 (1975).
t 9 1Nationalization may be defined as "the process whereby certain industries or
means of production distribution or exchange are, in pursuance of social or economic
policies, concentrated in public hands." 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 769
(1970).192Trends in Caribbean Worry U.S. Companies With Stake in Region, Wall St. J., May
17, 1976, at 1, col. 6.193 Bauxite Nationalization Act of 1971.
194Libya recently nationalized the assets of the British Petroleum Explorations
(Libya) Ltd., in reaction to Great Britain's failure to prevent Iranian occupation of
Arab islands in the Persian Gulf. The occupation did not affect Libya or its nationals
but a third country. See Haight, Libyan Nationalization of British Petroleum Company
Assets, 6 INT'L LAW. 541 (1972). See also NWOGUGU, supra note 164, at 21-24; Valdez,
supra note 10, at 3.
'
9 5Notes 15 & 16, supra.
196 1n I.R.C. & A.G. British Guiana v. Lilleyman, 7 W.I.R. 496 (1964), it was held
that property as contained in section 12(1) of the Constitution included money.
197See, e.g., ST. VINCENT CONST. OF 1965, § 6(1); BARBADOS CONST. OF 1966, § 16(1);
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO CONST. OF 1962, § 1(a); JAMAICA CONST. OF 1962, § 18(1).
"98See, e.g., BARBADOS CONST. OF 1966, §§ 16(1)(a),(b); JAMAICA CONST. OF 1962, §
18(1)(a); ST. VINCENT CONST. OF 1969, § 6(1)(b).
160 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
ment which has nationalized or contemplates nationalizing foreign
enterprises. 199
Conclusion
The Commonwealth Caribbean territories are indeed on the horns
of a dilemma. 200 The question is, how to achieve social and economic
development and at the same time retain social and economic
nationalism and control.
The multinational corporation transcends national boundaries. Its
power has been demonstrated by the concessions it can and has
obtained from host governments and by its effects on the economy of
the host countries in which it operates. Both the developed and the
developing countries are moving cautiously and deliberately to estab-
lish guidelines which will ensure fair and honest operation of the
MNC, while at the same time not having a negative effect on foreign
investments. 20 1 Such guidelines must be drawn up and complied with
if the less developed and developing countries are to achieve develop-
ment without being at the mercy of the MNC.
At the present stage of social and economic development in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, further progress, both short-term as well
as long-term, is dependent on the continued presence of the MNC and
its continued investment and commercial activity. The question of
social and economic nationalism and control is fundamentally one of
degree. The question is, what level of social and economic autonomy is
the optimum one in the national interest.
Numerous MNC's are present in the Commonwealth Caribbean,
for their subsidiaries are corporate citizens of practically all the Com-
monwealth Caribbean territories and are entitled to all the rights and
freedoms of any citizen of those territories. The counterpart of the
rights and freedoms of any citizens, however, is the bundle of obliga-
tions to which he is subject in the national interests of the country of
which he is a citizen. The MNC through its subsidiaries is no excep-
tion. The laws of the Commonwealth Caribbean should be
strengthened as outlined in this article. The guidelines which have
recently been promulgated 20 2 should be enacted into law to the extent
that this is feasible and rational.
The territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean should therefore
pursue a wise policy of retaining the presence of the MNC in an
operating framework of reasonable national control. The fundamental
objective must be a fair and equitable division of the fruit produced by
19 9TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO CONST. OF 1962, § 6.
200[1954] S.C.R. 558.
2011d.
20 2Moran, Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defence by Multinational Corpora-
tions: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in Natural Resources,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 273, 286-87 (1973); Grant, supra note 21, at 262-69.
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the combined resources and efforts of the MNC and those of the
Commonwealth Caribbean. The effective policy must be eternal vigi-
lance lest national interests be undermined, combined with a realistic
appraisal and awareness of what is necessary for social and economic
advance.
Indeed, the testing period is still ahead for the multinational
corporation. If it cannot resolve the contradictions it has created,
both internally and externally, as a result of being multinational in
a nationalistic world, it is unlikely to prosper. For the multinational
corporation is both cause and result - but also symbol - of a most
profound event of the post-World War II period - the split between
economy and sovereignty. 20 3
2 03CHEN-YOUNG, supra note 19, at 5.
2
°4Panel Discussion on "Developing and Enforcing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises," American Society of International Law 70th Annual Meeting,
Washington D.C. (April 22, 1976). The OECD, United Nations and OAS are all
intensely involved in the problem and the OECD has now agreed on a strict code of
conduct for multinationals. See N.Y. Times, May 27, 1976, at 1, col. 4.2
°
5By the OECD, supra note 204. In the U.S. the Corporate Accountability
Research Group is calling for greater national control over multinationals: "The
control of ... multinational corporations requires national authority." N.Y. Times,
May 9, 1976, § F, at 14.
206p. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 729 (1974).

